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A B S T R A C T
The need for transitioning towards low-carbon energy systems, and the recent boom in available data, allows for
a constant re-evaluation of global electricity sector decarbonization progress, and its underlying theoretical
assumptions. Arguably, the existing decarbonization literature and institutional support frameworks focus on
top-down supply side mechanisms, where policies, goals, access to financing, and technology innovation are
suggested as the main drivers. Here, we synthesize eleven global datasets that range from electricity dec-
arbonization progress, to quality of governance, to international fossil fuel subsidies, and environmental policies,
amongst several others, and use methods from data mining to explore the factors that may be fostering or
hindering decarbonization progress. This exercise allows us to present numerous hypotheses worth exploring in
future research. Some of these hypotheses suggest that policies might be ineffective when misaligned with
country specific motivators and inherent characteristics, that even in the absence of policy there are particular
inherent characteristics that foster decarbonization progress (e.g., relatively high local energy prices, foreign
energy import dependency and the absence of a large extractive resource base), and that the interaction of
country-specific enabling environments, inherent characteristics, and motivations is what determines dec-
arbonization progress, rather than stand-alone support mechanisms. We present the hypothesis that existing
support mechanisms for decarbonization may be relying too much on blanket strategies (e.g., policies, targets),
and that there is a need for support mechanisms that encompass a wider diversity of country-specific underlying
conditions.
1. Introduction
As nations look to decarbonize their electricity sector fuel mix, there
is a broad consensus that policies, technologies and long-term goal-
setting are the preferred mechanisms for enabling low-carbon transi-
tions [1–4]. Furthermore, these mechanisms have been motivated by
climate change mitigation, leaving out a wide range of alternative
reasons why countries would choose to pursue electricity sector dec-
arbonization. Countries that are global leaders in low-carbon transitions
now appear across a wide range of incomes, regions, and levels of de-
velopment, suggesting that there are multiple motivations, inherent
characteristics, and enabling environments that motivate countries to
pursue low-carbon pathways [5–7].
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Kenya, are three unconventional ex-
amples of countries that have taken significant steps towards the goal of
80% electricity decarbonization by 2050, and are over-performers re-
lative to other countries in their income group (Fig. 1). These three
countries demonstrate disparate motivations for electricity sector
decarbonization and yet have some of highest proportions of electricity
generation from non-hydropower renewable energy (24%, 46%, and
46% respectively) amongst low and low-middle income countries
($13,600, $4500, and $2800 per capita respectively). Comparatively,
other global low-carbon transition leaders such as Denmark, Germany,
and Portugal had a negligible fraction of electricity generation from
non-hydropower renewable resources when they were at a similar stage
of economic development (∼$7000 GDP per capita). This trend high-
lights that renewable energy technologies have become, on average,
increasingly cost-competitive for many countries across the entire in-
come spectrum, and illustrates the diversity and importance of other
mechanisms besides climate change mitigation policies to motivate
decarbonization (Fig. 1).
The existing literature is encompassing of a variety of theories of the
key drivers of electricity decarbonization, yet, it is still divided about
the determining mechanisms, drivers, and kindling factors that foster
decarbonization progress [8–10]. Arguably, and despite the variety of
existing theories, international support frameworks have followed a
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blanket strategy of policies and targets, ignoring that these support
mechanisms might be deemed ineffective – or significantly slowed
down – in a variety of country-specific contexts.
Some schools of thought argue that the combination of demand-pull
and technology-push policy instruments are essential for transitioning
towards low-carbon energy systems [11]. Others, argue that the co-
evolution of energy flows and markets, available technologies, and
policy regimes determine decarbonization progress [12–17]. Alter-
natively, others propose multi-level perspectives, suggesting that the
intersection of socio-technical systems (e.g., infrastructures and energy
markets), niche innovations (e.g., disruptive technologies and business
models), and exogenous slow-changing developments (e.g., demo-
graphics and ideologies) determines decarbonization progress [18–20].
Non-policy related decarbonization drivers such as industry lobbying
(e.g., manufacturing), quality of governance, political ideology, poli-
tical support and leadership type have been suggested to also play a
critical role in the pace of decarbonization [21,22].
Some literature also emphasize geographical perspectives on tran-
sitions, and put forth the notions of context, space and place of nations
as the necessary foreground to the impact that changes in socio-tech-
nical systems have on decarbonization [23]. Accordingly, there are also
arguments that civil society and social movements are at the core of
long-term support and progress towards decarbonization [24–26].
When discussing the adoption of particular renewable energy re-
sources, the literature suggests that the role and importance of first
adopters varies across technologies, with the evidence suggesting that
Fig. 1. Over and underperformers in electricity system decarbonization progress: The y-axis depicts the difference between a country's electricity sector
decarbonization progress and the progress of the cluster income group to which it belongs. Electricity sector ‘decarbonization progress’ is defined as the difference
between total percentage electricity generation from non-hydropower renewable resources between 1980 and 2014, or latest data available. Countries were clustered
by income (low-income ≤ $10,000 GDP/Capita, $US 10,000< low-middle income ≤ $20,000, $US 20,000 <high-middle income ≤$US 45,000, and $US
45,000<high-income). The median income value of each income cluster was calculated, and a relative progress score is assigned to each country by subtracting its
decarbonization progress since 1980 from the median progress score of the income cluster to which it belongs.
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they are more important for the global diffusion of wind and solar, than
for geothermal and biomass [27–29]. Fig. 2 depicts the spatio-temporal
diffusion of these technologies. Biomass for electricity generation has
seen widespread adoption for many decades, with Europe and the
Americas both being first adopters, albeit with different sustainability
practices. While most early adopters and countries in Europe have
slowly increased or diversified their sources of biomass production to-
gether with the adoption of best practices (trees, arable crops, algae and
other plans, agricultural and forest residues, effluents, sewage sludge,
manures, industrial by-products, organic municipal waste, and im-
ported biomass) [30–33], first adopters in the Americas and Africa have
seen a more unstable path with half of the first adopters experiencing a
significant decline in production due to a variety of factors including
the cost-competitiveness of other fuels and technologies, supply-chain
efficiency, unsustainable practices, climate change impacts, and in
some cases violent conflict [34–39]. Geothermal developments have
also seen early global adoption with the notable cases of Iceland, Kenya
and El Salvador. While Central American countries (El Salvador, Ni-
caragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala) have continued to increase the
adoption of geothermal energy in their energy mix, countries in the Rift
Valley, which have a large geothermal potential [40], have not fol-
lowed Kenya's path despite Kenya doubling its production in 2014
(40%). All first adopters, except for the Philippines, El Salvador, and
Mexico, whose production declined but are still pursuing the resource,
have continued to invest in further development. Still, despite the
presence of these first adopters, the observed benefits to energy security
as a cost-effective baseload, and nascent solutions to mitigate the un-
certainties and financial risks associated with drilling geothermal wells
on green fields, the global geothermal resource remains largely un-
developed [41,42]. The diffusion of wind and solar technologies have
been explored extensively by the literature, with a diversity of factors
being suggested as the preconditions for technological adoption in-
cluding policies to support the growth of the power sector, local en-
vironmental, social, economic and political variables, support for in-
novation, industrial development, and technological change, learning
and R&D support (and consequent reductions in investment costs),
feed-in-tariffs, financial incentives and production-tax credit schemes,
household social-demographics, resource potential, and spatial varia-
bility, local electricity cost, and the emergence of China and India as
global players in solar and technology development, among others
[24,43–46,28,47].
Finally, an emerging area of the literature is beginning to explore
the differences in the decision-making logic around renewable energy
technology adoption in the rising south. An interesting concept is that
of the ‘electricity ladder’ in which, as per capita income increases,
countries transition from domestic resources, to imported fuels, and
finally to capital-intensive modern electricity sources; with domestic
energy endowments hindering upwards progress on the energy ladder
[48]. In addition, new data and research suggest that low, middle-in-
come countries are able to move up on this energy ladder (at times,
Fig. 2. Global spatiotemporal diffusion of non-hydropower renewable energy technologies: This figure considers the adoption of a technology to be when at
least 1% of a country's total generation comes from a specific technology. It suggests that countries across a wide spectrum of social-demographics have historically
invested in renewable energy (e.g., geothermal and biomass), with wind and solar now experiencing the latest wave of investments and development. Geothermal
energy has seen very little growth in recent decades, despite its large potential.
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leapfrogging it) by accessing the global experience of earlier adopters
(high-income countries) in order to accelerate domestic market growth.
Late adopter countries have experienced accelerated growth rates for
wind and solar energy which are 4.7 and 16 times faster than early
adopters, respectively [49]. In this process, some research suggests that
subsidies have helped foster renewable energy growth in low-income
countries, while feed-in tariffs have fostered renewable energy growth
in middle-income countries [50]. These results suggest a renewable
energy policy ladder of sorts, with policy and enabling environments
(e.g., electricity market conditions, political capture, and the interac-
tion of administrative capacity with the complexity of renewable en-
ergy policies) affecting low, and middle-income groups differently [50].
Together, this research suggests, that innovation and policy for-
mulation is not sufficient in countries with an “institutional gap”, and
suggests that deep knowledge of local contexts, clear and strong fi-
nancial incentives, predictability of government decision making, and
streamlined permitting procedures are as important (or more) as the
existence of innovation and policy formulation [51,52]. Like the energy
transitions literature suggests, the repertoire of policies for late tech-
nology adopters should be very different from those established by first
adopters and early pioneers, especially if the technology carries low risk
[27]. The recognition of this central issue is key to designing incentives
that work specifically for countries who want to simply adopt tech-
nology, and do not seek to invest in research and development of a new
industry like market leaders tend to prefer. This is the case of many
countries in the global south. As policies like renewable energy goals,
renewable portfolio standards, and feed-in tariffs have begun to im-
plemented globally, it is becoming increasingly more important to
consider that a country's context (e.g., local prices, geography, social,
political) might be equally important, or more, to making progress or
hindering electricity sector decarbonization progress than policies
alone [53,54].
As shown in Table 1 with regards to the methodology that is used to
study electricity sector transitions, we find that there is a preference for
political economy, multiple case study comparative analysis and tra-
ditional methods of statistical hypothesis testing, and econometrics,
rather than data mining (Table 1). Overall, these papers suggest that
policy instruments are effective but insufficient drivers of dec-
arbonization, and that countries that employ multi-dimensional dec-
arbonization mechanisms that are based on economic, environmental
and social factors have a more successful deployment rate of renewable
energy. Many of the studies that use econometrics and/or traditional
methods of statistical hypothesis testing use only one data source, ra-
ther than pooled data from different sources to perform their analysis.
Furthermore, many of the studies in the literature may experience
sample selection and omitted variable bias. The first leads to selecting a
non-random or incomplete sample, that can lead to either an over-
estimation or an underestimation of research results. The latter, may
lead to attributing the effect of a missing variable to the included
variables in the model, potentially overestimating the research results.
While some of the methods used in traditional statistical hypothesis
testing and data mining might be the same, the intention and the way in
which the analyses are performed are very different. Data mining is
used, in general, to explore and discover patterns and knowledge from
data. It is commonly used as a data exploration step, rather than for
hypothesis testing [55]. A big difference between data mining and
econometric analysis, for example, is that the latter establishes hy-
potheses before data exploration and analysis begins. Econometric
models and traditional methods in traditional statistical hypothesis
testing establish a theoretical framework upon which data is collected
and a model is built. Data mining approaches collect as much data as
possible, and then implements techniques to identify patterns, group-
ings, clusters and prediction, without a prior theoretical framework. We
expound on these differences in the methodology section.
Data-driven approaches and thought frameworks derived from be-
havioral science are also missing from the literature discourse regarding
top-down climate change decision making and global decarbonization
progress [56,57]. This paper aims to fill this gap by integrating a
mixture of data mining methods, behavioral science theory, and his-
torical perspectives to uncover key features of the global low-carbon
electricity sector transition. Rather than choosing a few countries to
perform our analysis, we gather data from 130 countries and 10 global
datasets of energy, electricity, economic, sustainability and social pro-
gress (among others) and employ a variety of data mining methods to
extract key features that may be driving decarbonization across regions,
incomes and levels of development. We shed light on features of elec-
tricity sector level transitions that are once again emerging, some that
are changing, and new themes that require attention.
We define inherent characteristics as those that are both very dif-
ficult and/or that would take a long time to change in a country. For
example, population and land size can change over time, but the first
requires either a very long time to observe a large change or an abrupt
shock (e.g., war), while the latter requires redrawing of a country's
borders either through diplomacy or war (among other methods).
Other, perhaps less discernable inherent characteristics include a select
group of economic indicators which, on average, can take many dec-
ades to observe any discernable change. Here we include income per
capita, inequality, level of corruption, quality of governance and in-
frastructure, level of foreign investment dependency, and levels of de-
pendency on resource rents. These characteristics are very different
from enabling environments, or characteristics that can change from
one year to the next. We suggest enabling environments as those
characteristics which, in theory, could significantly affect inherent
characteristics over long periods of time. Enabling environments in-
clude the number or renewable energy policies, the amount of invest-
ments in renewable energy per area and per capita, and energy prices.
Politicians and international financial institutions can, in a matter of
months or years, pass new policies, agree on investment amounts and
begin spending, and or increase or reduce energy prices pursuing po-
litical or policy related objectives. Inherent characteristics and enabling
environments play different roles in electricity decarbonization and we
expound on this further below. Motivations have a much clearer dis-
tinction than enabling environments and intrinsic characteristics. In our
data, we observe countries that pursue electricity decarbonization for a
diverse set of reasons. Some seek simply to minimize the cost of their
optimal power dispatch, while others seek to increase electricity access
and grid expansion at least cost. Others pursue electricity dec-
arbonization in parallel to energy independence efforts, while others
pursue it with motivations related to climate related goals and cost-
minimization objectives.
Our work highlights three research gaps in the literature: a gap in
support mechanism strategies, a methodological and data gap, and a
lexicon gap. First, our literature review and data exploration suggest
that there are no blanket support mechanism strategies for electricity
sector decarbonization progress, or ‘one size fits all’ policy approaches.
Rather, it suggests that the complex interaction between enabling en-
vironments, inherent characteristics, and motivations contribute to ei-
ther fostering or hindering decarbonization progress. Second, we con-
tribute methodologically by using 10 data sets over several decades to
explore decarbonization-related data using exploratory data analysis
and data mining methods to elucidate new groupings, clusters, new
research questions and hypotheses that are worth exploring. This ap-
proach can help research that relies on confirmatory data analysis to
avoid statistical issues related to double-dipping, sample selection bias,
and omitted variable bias that are common in the literature. Finally,
while the literature suggests that the factors determining decarboniza-
tion progress fall into ‘two buckets’ (policy and non-policy drivers), we
argue that this vision is limited, and we propose the hypothesis that we
should cluster countries across inherent characteristics, enabling en-
vironments, and motivations.
The next section describes the global electricity, energy, economic,
sustainability and development data used in this analysis, and the
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statistical and data mining approach employed. The results and dis-
cussion section incorporate insights from behavioral science literature
to propose new hypotheses worth exploring at the intersection of en-
abling environments, motivations, and inherent characteristics. The last
section concludes.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Global energy, sustainability and development data
We collect and synthesize data for 190 countries and territories from
the World Bank Development Indicators [58], Bloomberg New Energy
Finance's Climatescope [5], the Energy Information Administration
[59], the Quality of Governance Initiative [60], the International En-
ergy Agency and IRENA's joint policies and measures database for
global renewable energy [61], the International Monetary Fund's fossil
fuel subsidies database [62], the Global Footprint Network [63], the
United Nations Human Development Indicators [64], Yale's Environ-
mental Performance Index [65], the Social Progress Imperative data
[66], and the World Energy Council [67].
These data include a variety of measures and proxies for sustain-
ability, foreign energy import dependence, local resource dependence,
governance and quality of institutions, renewable and climate related
policies, human development, energy financing, resource consumption
(e.g., electricity demand, total energy demand growth rates, electricity
and total energy demand rates of change), and country specific char-
acteristics such as land size, population, population density, and gross
domestic product, among many other variables. We clean and merge
the data to create a 130-country dataset that contains the majority of
the aggregated features. We then plot and analyze correlations across
variables, and perform our analysis on a subset of 76 countries where
generation from non-hydropower renewable resources has increased by
more than 1% between 1980 and 2014 (or year of latest data). We
further subset these data from 76 countries into two groups that are
above or below an average income per capita $US 30,000 (31 and 45
countries respectively). More details on the data and the data cleaning
process are available in the Supplementary Information. All data and
code are available by contacting the authors.
2.1.2. Methodology
Our analysis is an illustration of techniques that can be employed
for exploring data, and elucidating new hypotheses and questions, ra-
ther than pursuing causal inference. In general, data mining is used to
explore and discover patterns and knowledge from data [55]. Some of
the results of a data mining exercise include visualization, the identi-
fication of multiple groups in data (clustering), anomaly detection,
exploration of relationships and dependencies across variables, classi-
fication, and summarization, among others. We use all these techniques
in our analysis. It is commonly used as a data exploration step, rather
than hypothesis testing, and often uses the same methods as traditional
statistical hypothesis testing. Performing statistical hypothesis testing
after extensively exploring data, however, is called ‘data snooping’, and
may lead to ‘double dipping’ or ‘circular analysis’ - potentially mis-
construing the results from hypothesis testing (as opposed to pre-
planned statistical hypothesis testing, where a researcher establishes
hypotheses before data exploration and analysis). In this paper, we take
a data mining approach to the data we have gathered in an attempt to
discover research gaps, new groupings, and relationships, as well as
elucidating new research hypotheses that are worthwhile pursuing. We
employ some of the most common methodologies in a data mining
exercise including visualization, principal component analysis, prin-
cipal component regressions, clustering, and prediction. Our goal is not
to test hypotheses, but rather, to explore new data and bring to light
new questions.
We use principal component regressions (PCR) to reconstruct a
dependent variable that tracks electricity sector ‘decarbonization pro-
gress’ defined as the difference between total percentage electricity
generation from non-hydropower renewable resources between 1980
and 2014, or latest data available. PCR is a regression technique based
on principal component analysis (PCA), where it uses the principal
components as predictors in a linear regression model fitted using least
squares [68,69]. PCR is valuable as it aids in performing dimensionality
reduction, avoidance of multicollinearity between predictors (can be
run on highly correlated or even collinear data), it drops components
that do not explain much variance in the data, and mitigates overfitting.
Principal component analysis extracts features that capture the most
variance in global decarbonization datasets, and a k-means algorithm
clusters countries across the most important features in global energy,
environment and development data. We use y-scaled principal com-
ponent regressions to reconstruct a dependent variable that measures
progress in enabling a low-carbon electricity sector level transition
which we define as the difference between total percentage electricity
generation from non-hydropower renewable resources from 1980 to
2014, or latest data available [70]. Our proxy for decarbonization
progress measures the growth, or decline, in the contribution of non-
hydropower renewable energy towards electricity generation across
three decades for countries with available data.
We first log-normalize variables with a skewed distribution and
perform a feature scaling methodology where all features are scaled
with respected to our dependent variable (predictor variables are re-
scaled to be in y-units). After statistical significance pruning and di-
mensionality reduction on the whole data, we implement a principal
components regression methodology to estimate decarbonization pro-
gress by using the principal components that capture most of the var-
iation. We choose this method rather than a model-driven hypothesis
testing framework, as we are not testing a particular hypothesis, but
rather, are attempting to extract the features that may best predict
decarbonization progress from these data. On the full data set, we are
able to capture 60% of the variation with the first 20 principal com-
ponents, and are able to capture 70% of the variation with 20 principal
components in the lower-income subset of countries. Afterwards, a k-
means algorithm using the top 20 principal components for both in-
come groups is used to extract the countries that are part of each
cluster. We use the elbow method and silhouette scores to determine
the optimal number of country clusters within each of the top 20
principal components.
3. Results and discussion
Analyzing the contribution of each variable in our data to every
principal component allows us to explore which variables better cap-
ture variance in our data, and thus present new hypotheses about global
decarbonization progress. We use principal component loadings to
understand the relationship and contribution of each variable in our
data to each principal component. Principal component loadings depict
the correlation between each component and the original variable, and
squaring them tells us the amount of variation that each variable con-
tributes to each principal component. In the full dataset, there are
several features that emerge as useful predictors of decarbonization
progress. We categorize these features into inherent characteristics,
enabling environments, and motivations, and key examples are shown
in Table 2.
When we perform our analysis on the subset of countries with in-
come per capita below $US 30,000, we find that local energy prices
(fuel and electricity), foreign energy import dependency, investments
per capita and per km2, and historical early investments in renewable
energy (such as biomass for electricity and geothermal) have more
predictive power, whereas the predictive power of variables describing
quality of governance infrastructure and policy support for renewable
energy is significantly reduced. Further explanation of our methodology
and results appears in the supplemental information.
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Our next step was to determine the optimal clusters of clusters for
the top 20 principal components in each data set, and extract the
countries that were part of each cluster. The full dataset has three stable
clusters, and the data subset of countries with income per capita below
$US 30,000 has five stable clusters. For the former, countries are
grouped according to land size, energy dependency, energy intensity of
the economy, subsidies to fossil fuels and electricity, and rates of eco-
nomic growth. For the latter, a different set of variables cluster the data
including inherent characteristics, and enabling environments.
Additional details on the data, figures, statistics and methodology are
presented at length in the Supplementary Information.
As described above, the features that best predict decarbonization
progress can be clustered into two dimensions: inherent characteristics
and enabling environments. Features with predictive power that are
positively correlated with progress in decarbonization in both income
groups include income per capita, investments in renewable energy per
km2 and per capita, levels of foreign energy import dependency, energy
prices (e.g., gasoline, retail, industrial, commercial and residential
electricity prices) and early historical investments in renewable energy
such as biomass and geothermal energy. Features with predictive power
that are negatively correlated with progress in decarbonization include
increasing levels of dependency on resource extraction, subsidies to
fossil fuels, and levels of economic dependency on the export of fossil
fuels. Features with predictive power that are only present in the full
data (includes countries with an income per capita above and below
$US 30,000) but not the lower income group include the human de-
velopment index, number of policies passed to foster renewable energy,
a variety of metrics for measuring international aid, and the quality of
governance and infrastructure. The following sections unpack the data
and results within our principal component regressions and analysis,
and propose several new hypotheses for improving our understanding
decarbonization progress. We frame results from our analysis by fo-
cusing on inherent characteristics, enabling environments and moti-
vations. Full descriptions of the results from the principal component
regressions are available in the supplemental information.
3.1. A spectrum of political environments, policies, and quality of
governance
The raw data and analysis employed here suggest that progress in
global decarbonization is occurring across a spectrum of political and
policy enabling environments, and diverse qualities of governance and
infrastructure [59,61]. Fig. 3 depicts a diversity of enabling environ-
ments: countries with great carbon responsibility and many policies
making little progress (e.g., USA and China), countries passing policies
yet moving slowly or even going backwards (e.g., Mexico, Canada,
Indonesia, and Paraguay), countries with few policies yet transitioning
rapidly (e.g., Iceland, Nicaragua, and Kenya), and clusters of countries
where more policies may enable or foster change (e.g., Germany, Spain,
Denmark, Lithuania, Ireland, and Costa Rica). Countries with relatively
low-scores with regards to quality of infrastructure and governance are
performing equally as well, and in some cases, better than countries
with conventional notions of good governance and infrastructure.
Even in the absence of major climate change policy instruments,
countries in the rising south have been making rapid progress towards
decarbonization, catalyzed by various motivations and using a wide
range of different approaches. We highlight a few prominent cases:
Nicaragua, Uruguay, Morocco, Honduras, Kenya, Brazil and Chile.
Some of these motivations include energy independence and security,
as well as the opportunistic economic profit from regional inter-
connections, for countries such as Nicaragua (46% non-hydro renew-
able energy generation) [71], Uruguay (16%), and Morocco (7%)
[72,73]. Others have unique motivations, enabling environments and
inherent characteristics such as Honduras (11%), which recently be-
came the first non-island country in the world to have 10% solar ca-
pacity despite an institutional breakdown and its current violent crime
crisis [74,75]. Also Costa Rica (24%), which has a long tradition of
conservation and environmental stewardship surrounding coffee and
eco-tourism, and Kenya (46%), whose crippling droughts in the 1990s
incentivized the country towards a power sector reform and early in-
vestments in geothermal [76]. Furthermore, Brazil (10%), despite large
hydropower generation, oil dependency, and current political in-
stability, has one of the most progressive solar net-metering policies in
the world (and one of the most progressive uses of biofuels) [77,78],
and Chile (10%), has seen renewable energy progress motivated by the
provision of cheap power to the power-hungry mining industry in the
northern part of the country [79].
Denmark's global leadership in wind energy development dates
back to the 1900s, but it was the energy crisis of the 1970s that moti-
vated its decarbonization, combined with enabling environments such
as grassroots opposition to nuclear energy and community-driven wind
cooperatives, that have catalyzed the low-carbon transition the country
observes today [80,24,81–85].
For the United States, it is meaningful to consider change beyond
the nation as a whole, as the national politics of climate change become
insurmountable. Cities and states continue to make much faster pro-
gress than the nation by creating enabling environments through policy
action and opportunistic investments. California, New York and Hawaii
have created enabling environments for decarbonization by adopting
aggressive renewable energy policy goals (50% by 2030 for California
and New York, and 100% by 2045 for Hawaii) [86–89], while states
like Iowa, South Dakota, and Kansas produce the nation's largest shares
of wind energy generation (31%, 26%, and 24% respectively) [59]
through opportunistic investments. Interestingly, the latter are the na-
tion's wind energy generation leaders while also being more rural and
republican-majority states, and having more relaxed policy targets than
California, New York and Hawaii, suggesting that there are multiple
and equally important motivations for pursuing energy system dec-
arbonization.
3.2. Inherent characteristics and enabling environments as drivers of global
electricity sector decarbonization
Results from our analysis present the hypothesis that features such
as relatively high energy prices (e.g., fuel, commercial, retail and spot
prices), renewable energy investments per capita and per km2, and
energy import dependency create enabling environments and are as-
sociated with a faster pace of decarbonization (Figs. 4 and 5A). Beyond
enabling environments for decarbonization, here we highlight how the
inherent characteristics of countries create opportunities or barriers for
achieving decarbonization.
Features that are negatively correlated with decarbonization pro-
gress include a large dependency on natural resource rents as a per-
centage of GDP, a high percentage of fuel exports as merchandise
Table 2
Dimensions of decarbonization.
Dimension Key examples
Inherent characteristics Population, land size, income per capita, inequality, quality of governance, level of foreign energy dependency, level of dependency on resource rents.
Enabling environments Renewable energy policies, investments in renewable energy per area and per capita, energy prices.
Motivations Social progress, local sustainability, energy independence, climate change mitigation, political leadership.
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exports, and being a large net energy exporter (Fig. 5A and B). Con-
versely, relatively high energy prices (e.g., fuel, commercial, retail and
spot prices), renewable energy investments per capita and per km2, and
energy import dependency are associated with a faster pace of dec-
arbonization.
Fossil fuel lock-in and a large dependence on fossil fuel exports
should present weariness for global decarbonization policy makers. The
United States is set to become a net energy exporter within the next
decade [90]; China provides the largest amount of fossil fuel subsidies
in the world (while almost single handedly having catalyzed the drop in
solar PV prices) [62] and several top-ten CO2 emitters such as Russia,
Iran, and Saudi Arabia are all largely dependent on resource rents
(Fig. 5B). In addition to the vast existing literature regarding the eco-
nomic impacts of a large dependency on fossil fuel exports, new lit-
erature details how there could be an emerging wave of carbon lock-in
affecting the rising south through the global renaissance of coal
[91,92]. While this scenario may seem daunting, it is important to
highlight that the data also suggests that there exists enabling en-
vironments and intrinsic characteristics that present pockets of oppor-
tunity where long-term decarbonization could be enabled. Countries
without a strong natural-resource-rents dependency and energy import
dependent, with relatively high energy prices, with relatively higher
renewable energy investments per capita and per km2, could make
significant progress towards long-term decarbonization (Fig. 5A and B).
In these observations, only Chile and Papua New Guinea (PNG)
appear as outliers with vast fossil fuel and mineral resources, hence are
vulnerable to carbon lock-in and fossil fuel export dependency.
However, the two are making significant progress towards dec-
arbonization. In Chile, solar and wind investments are displacing fossil
fuel expenditures in mining. Chile's mines produce the largest amount
of fine copper, the second largest amount of gold, and half the world's
lithium, with mining consuming approximately 85% of capacity in its
northern electricity grid [79]. PNG was the first country to submit the
final version of its nationally determined contributions at the Con-
ference of the Parties climate negotiations in Paris. PNG's economy is
greatly reliant on the export earnings from minerals and energy ex-
traction [93] and thus far has only developed about 2% of its high
potential for renewable energy. Without specific measures such as feed-
in tariffs, or green certificates, PNG – with large geothermal potential –
has begun attempting to shift towards the adoption of renewables in an
effort to reduce local consumption of fossil fuels and increase the
profitability of from the mineral and petroleum sectors [93–95].
3.3. Motivation as a key driver for electricity sector decarbonization
progress
Taking into account the existing literature, results from our ex-
ploratory analysis, and the numerous challenges to increase the pace of
global electricity decarbonization (e.g., political, institutional, techno-
logical and behavioral) [91] we suggest that it is it is crucial to define
new strategies and support mechanisms to rekindle efforts towards
global decarbonization. Climate change mitigation is often cited as the
main motivation for decarbonization, with contingent monetary re-
wards, global meeting invitations, and capacity-building exercises
made available if countries create enabling environments to achieve
those goals. There has been little discussion, however, about the crea-
tion of support mechanisms geared towards other motivations besides
climate change that can catalyze long-term low-carbon electricity
Fig. 3. Quality of governance, infrastructure, number of energy policies since 1974 and decarbonization progress. The figure depicts the difference between
total percentage generation from non-hydropower renewable resources between 1980 and 2014 as a function of the number of pro-renewable energy policies passed
since 1974, and Quality of Governance and Infrastructure.
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sector transitions.
In recent years, behavioral research has brought to light the im-
portance of understanding the diverse motivations that exist behind
climate and environment-related goals, and the risks of using extrinsic
motivators to facilitate long-term behavioral change. While this re-
search has focused on the individual level, it has come to a broad
consensus that a multitude of factors determine the adoption or aver-
sion to adopting renewable energy technologies. These factors include
appeal comparisons of monetary vs. non-monetary incentives (e.g.,
morals, environmental and climate change co-benefits) [96,97], the
benefits and caveats of using competitions to achieving goals [98], and
the perils of framing solutions around unique political ideologies [99].
For example, research in the United States has shown that, in some
states, framing adoption of energy efficiency technology as an en-
vironmental beneficial solution can be detrimental to its adoption [99].
A desire to understand the motivations through which individuals may
adopt or fail to adopt a behavior change or a new technology ties many
of these studies together, generally finding that intrinsic motivation can
be one of the most effective mechanisms for inducing long-term beha-
vioral change [97,100–103].
Frameworks for designing support mechanisms for electricity sector
level decarbonization could borrow intellectually from self-determina-
tion and intrinsic motivation theory in behavioral research [104,105].
Generally, the theory suggests that motivation appears across a con-
tinuum of extrinsic and intrinsic processes, in which pure intrinsic
motivation is guided by interest, enjoyment, and inherent satisfaction,
and pure extrinsic motivation is guided by group compliance, and the
presence of external rewards and punishments [104,105]. The theory
suggests that extrinsic motivators (e.g., monetary rewards and punish-
ments) may often forestall intrinsic motivation and merely provide
short-term change simply as compliance, and efforts to change may
quickly end if the incentive or reward is removed. Considering global
decarbonization frameworks, we argue that it is crucial to think about a
country's historical motivations when enacting change in order to de-
sign adequate support mechanisms. Local and global environmental
challenges, climate mitigation, technological innovation and leader-
ship, energy independence and national security, the creation of niche
markets and new industries, economic efficiency, group compliance,
and need for foreign direct investment are a few of the motivators that
may drive electricity sector level decarbonization.
Results from our analysis and literature review suggest the hy-
pothesis that framing decarbonization under an over-arching motiva-
tion of climate change mitigation might be disadvantageous for long-
term progress. Instead, support mechanisms could be designed by first
understanding the unique motivations of countries, and by working
with local change agents to design strategies that best fit their inherent
characteristics and enabling environments. We do not aim to over-
simply the decision-making process around low-carbon transitions by
bringing in elements of behavioral research into the discussion; or re-
present the decision-making process as if it were coming from a unified
decision-making body. Instead, our analysis aims to enrichen the dis-
cussion by bringing new elements that are not often discussed in the
transitions literature. Indeed, as we have previously shown, the data,
literature, and historical evidence suggest that countries chose different
electricity generation technologies over others through a complicated
process of opportunistic investments, cost competitiveness, natural re-
source endowments, policies, and individual motivators, among others.
To provide an example for framing this hypothesis, we construct a
decarbonization motivation spectrum using data from the Social
Progress Imperative, the Quality of Governance Initiative, the Yale
Fig. 4. Investments in renewable energy and decarbonization progress: the figure depicts the difference between total percentage generation from non-hy-
dropower renewable resources between 1980 and 2014 as a function of renewable energy investments per capita and per km2.
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Environmental Performance Index, the Global Footprint Network and
the World Bank Development Indicators [63,66,60,58,65] to create
proxies for three key motivators: social progress, local sustainability,
and desire for energy independence. We scale these metrics and assign a
score to each country across the sum of these three motivators, and plot
the score against a dependent variable tracking decarbonization pro-
gress. We find a change in the slope at a motivational score of 1.75
(observed as an elbow in Fig. 6), with countries that score higher along
Fig. 5. Energy prices, fossil fuel subsidies, mineral and fossil fuel resource dependency and decarbonization progress: the figure depicts the difference
between total percentage generation from non-hydropower renewable resources between 1980 and 2014 as a function of energy prices, dependency on resource rents
and fossil fuel subsidies.
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the motivational spectrum having made greater progress towards dec-
arbonization. There are four outliers: Kenya, Nicaragua, Denmark and
Lithuania – all over-performers relative to their income groups – and
with different motivations for sustained decarbonization progress.
To help construct questions around this hypothesis, we provide a
conceptual framework for a country's decarbonization pathway (Fig. 7).
First, we hypothesize that one must understand the unique intrinsic
motivations that could drive change in different countries, and then, the
inherent characteristics (unchangeable, or very hard to change) and
enabling environments (constantly evolving) are taken into account to
design and implement support mechanisms to promote decarbonization
(see Supplementary Information for details).
4. Conclusion
This research suggests that there is not one major driver of
decarbonization, but rather, a multitude of factors that can contribute
to transformative progress. It also presents the hypothesis that clus-
tering the factors that foster decarbonization into binary categories of
‘policy and non-policy drivers’ is too limiting, and thus proposes three
alternative categories – inherent characteristics, enabling environments
and motivations. Our literature review and analysis suggest that glob-
ally, there are many countries with favorable combinations of inherent
characteristics and enabling environments for kindling decarbonization
that remain, however, in the path towards carbon lock-in. This, we
argue, can be prevented and we suggest four hypotheses worth in-
vestigating to reinvigorate global decarbonization progress, as follows:
4.1. Identify and invest in pockets of demand-side opportunity
Our analysis suggests that there are favorable enabling environ-
ments and inherent characteristics that enable decarbonization to occur
Fig. 6. Countries across the decarbonization motivation spectrum: The figure depicts the difference between total percentage generation from non-hydropower
renewable resources between 1980 and 2014 (or most recent year) across all countries as they move along a spectrum defined by three identified transition
motivators: local sustainability, social progress, and energy independence. A change in the slope appears at a threshold score of 1.75.
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rapidly, and unfavorable conditions that slow down decarbonization
progress. Identifying and tapping into pockets of opportunity with fa-
vorable conditions in order to support neighbor and technology diffu-
sion effects across a diversity of regions, incomes, and levels of devel-
opment could be a way to spark progress. To do this, support
mechanisms could be tailored uniquely to fit the inherent character-
istics, enabling environments and motivations of a particular country.
While most energy system decarbonization analyses focus on supply-
side opportunities (e.g., renewable resource potential maps), we argue
that it may be equally or more important to focus on country-specific
demand-side drivers (identified by characterizing the enabling en-
vironment, inherent characteristics and motivations) and create a di-
versity of mechanisms to support them.
4.2. Diversify the types of support mechanisms for decarbonization
While the 21st Conference of the Parties meeting in Paris was suc-
cessful due to the number of parties that submitted Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions (INDCs), as well as the types of proposals
that were put forward, recent analysis of the INDCs also suggests that
these goals would not be sufficient to meet current global stabilization
targets [106,64]. More importantly, there is an absence of support
mechanisms that could tie a country's immediate needs and its intrinsic
motivations to the long-term decarbonization goals and strategies
stated in its INDCs. For example, some countries might be motivated by
political and technological leadership, while others might be more
motivated by national security, energy access and economic efficiency.
Designing diverse support mechanisms, such as pay by performance
goals, financing country-specific intrinsic motivators, local capacity
building, and technological partnerships, that are reflective of the di-
versity of motivations could support clusters of countries unified by
similar motivations. These clusters could encourage countries to learn
from each other and try new ways of thinking about energy transitions,
while working on their country-specific goals that in turn support
progress towards decarbonization.
4.3. Diversify the change agents that receive support for decarbonization
In some countries, government institutions can foster top-down
enabling environments for decarbonization. However, in other coun-
tries, government institutions can create roadblocks to energy system
transformation [51,52]. As the energy transitions literature suggests,
the repertoire of policies and institution types designed to support late
technology adopters should be very different from those for first
adopters and early pioneers, especially if the technology carries low risk
[50,27]. Recognizing the appropriate change agents is key to designing
support mechanisms that work specifically for countries who want to
simply adopt technology, and do not seek to build research and de-
velopment capacity like first adopters tend to prefer. To tap these
pockets of opportunity, it is crucial to identify local successful change
agents and provide support mechanisms that help them achieve their
goals.
4.4. Think beyond energy and support non-optimal pathways
While it is useful to develop and analyze optimal techno-economic
decarbonization pathways, in reality, most countries have complex
political, socio-economic and cultural constraints that are not ac-
counted for in such analyses, making engineered optimal pathways
unattainable. A narrow focus on techno-economic optimality could be
detrimental to realizing even modest progress on decarbonization. For
example, countries where local pollution, water scarcity and manage-
ment, garbage, or deforestation pathways might be immediate pressing
issues, a narrow focus on least-cost technologically optimal energy
pathways could overplay the promise of large-scale wind and solar
developments, as compared to alternative solutions including methane
Fig. 7. The decarbonization motivation spectrum. The diagram illustrates how the decarbonization motivation spectrum could be used when evaluating or
designing support mechanisms for long-term decarbonization. Countries are evaluated on an individual basis, analyzing their historical trajectories related to
decision making and a spectrum of motivators surrounding energy planning. After identifying key motivators, country-specific inherent characteristics and enabling
environments are considered in the design of long-term decarbonization support mechanisms.
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collecting at landfills, water use efficiency programs (that in turn save
energy), or funding for inclusive and fair conservation land manage-
ment practices that may in fact be better suited for a particular country.
There are many countries around the world with favorable inherent
characteristics and enabling environments features for long-term dec-
arbonization, but also many without them. Our analysis presents the
hypothesis that it is crucial for change agents, policymakers, and fi-
nanciers to understand the roles of intrinsic motivation, inherent
characteristics and enabling environments in finding new pockets of
investment for renewable energy. This is corroborated by recent lit-
erature [96,97,99–102] that suggest a wide spectrum of features that
foster decarbonization ranging from sustainability, to energy in-
dependence and national security, to technological leadership and so-
cial progress [107]. Designing support mechanisms that are encom-
passing of this wide spectrum of motivations is crucial for sparking
decarbonization across incomes, regions, and levels of human devel-
opment
We conclude by highlighting several limitations in our approach.
Throughout the manuscript, we mention the political economy and the
historical development of renewable resources in different regions and
countries. However, we have not included variables that can accurately
capture these important components. Variables that could be included
in future analysis are a breakdown of all policy types by implementa-
tion year and by country, variables that capture the forms of govern-
ment in a country and how they have been changing over time, and the
political support that these policies have, among other variables. In
addition, future research could more carefully select variables included
in the analysis. This includes variables that might be missing (e.g.,
political economy variables) and removing variables that might be
highly correlated with each other. There are also gaps and limitations in
our methodology. While PCA and PCR are useful for dealing with highly
correlated variables, there is merit in removing variables that are highly
correlated as this may cause the PCA to overemphasize the contribution
of nearly-redundant variables. Setting a rigorous methodology to con-
tinuously collect data from all the sources in this analysis, and con-
tinuously improving the prediction of decarbonization progress for
different groupings and clusters across enabling environments, moti-
vations, and inherent characteristics would be an incredibly beneficial
and useful space for future research to support the design of more
successful mechanisms and accelerate the pace of low-carbon electricity
sector transitions around the world.
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